Skip to main content
Book RecommendationCompassionEmpathic DistressNeuroscienceFoundationsResearch

Against Empathy: The Philosophical Case for the Distinction CompassionSolution.Org Insists On

The For Clinicians page distinguishes empathy from compassion at the level of neuroscience, drawing on Singer and Klimecki. Paul Bloom's 2016 book is the philosophical version of the same argument, made with the rigor philosophy at its best can bring to a question of public moral interest. The provocative title is part of why the argument has been productive.

7 min read
Essential Understanding
Bloom defines empathy narrowly as the felt experience of taking on another person's emotional state, then argues that empathy in this sense is a poor guide to moral action: in-group biased, innumerate, short-sighted, and exhausting to the empathizer. What he advocates is rational compassion, care that is informed by reason, calibrated to evidence, and sustainable in the helper. The argument is the philosophical version of the empathy-compassion distinction CompassionSolution.Org rests on.

CompassionSolution.Org's For Clinicians page distinguishes empathy from compassion at the level of neuroscience, drawing on Singer and Klimecki 2014. The argument that authentic compassion is regenerative while empathic distress is depleting is one of CompassionSolution.Org's central positions. Against Empathy, published in 2016, is the philosophical version of that same argument, made by Paul Bloom with the rigor philosophy at its best can bring to a public-policy question. The book's title is provocative; its argument is precisely aligned with what CompassionSolution.Org is doing.

Bloom is a professor of psychology and cognitive science. He held appointments at Yale for many years, then moved to the University of Toronto. He is a working empirical psychologist, but the book operates more in the register of philosophy than of laboratory research. The argument is conceptual, but it is grounded in the empirical literature throughout.

The argument

The argument the book makes is that empathy, defined narrowly as the felt experience of taking on another person's emotional state, is a poor guide to moral action. The book develops this case across several lines.

Empathy is in-group biased. We find it easier to empathize with people who are like us, who share our background, who look like our families, who speak our language. The very mechanism that makes empathy feel like moral motivation also makes it produce moral distortion. Suffering that is harder to empathize with, because the sufferer is more distant, less identifiable, or culturally different, gets correspondingly less moral weight. This is not a reason to be against compassion. It is a reason to be against treating empathy as the foundation of moral action.

Empathy is innumerate. One identifiable victim, with a name and a face, moves us more than statistical evidence about thousands. The scale of suffering is invisible to empathy. A practice that takes empathy as its anchor will direct attention and resources toward what is salient rather than what is largest, which produces predictably distorted moral and policy outcomes.

Empathy is short-sighted. It directs attention to the immediate suffering rather than to longer-term consequences. The empathic response to a crying child is to give them what they want; the compassionate response is calibrated to what is actually good for them, which sometimes is not what they want. Bloom's clinical examples include parenting and medicine, where the difference is concrete.

Empathy is exhausting. Sustained empathic absorption depletes the empathizer. This is CompassionSolution.Org's empathic distress pathway in different language. A practitioner whose felt response to suffering is empathic absorption will reach a depletion ceiling quickly. A practitioner whose felt response is compassion will not, because the underlying neural circuitry is different.

What Bloom advocates is what he calls rational compassion. Care that is informed by reason, that is calibrated to evidence rather than to immediacy, that includes people whose suffering is statistical or distant, and that is sustainable in the helper because it does not require absorbing the suffering of every person helped. The argument maps directly onto the Singer and Klimecki neuroscience: the neural circuits associated with empathic distress are different from the neural circuits associated with compassionate response, and the latter are protective.

Three contributions that bear directly on CompassionSolution.Org

The first contribution is the philosophical case for the distinction CompassionSolution.Org's For Clinicians page makes. The neuroscience makes the case at the mechanistic level. The empirical research makes the case at the outcomes level. The philosophical case Bloom makes operates at the conceptual level, which is the level at which the cultural assumption that empathy and compassion are the same thing has to be addressed if it is to be loosened.

The second contribution is the in-group bias argument. CompassionSolution.Org's For Healthcare Systems page argues that compassionate organizations have to extend compassion across the boundaries that empathy alone would not cross: across the patient/staff line, across the disciplinary lines, across the demographic lines that produce health disparities. Bloom's argument is the conceptual support for that organizational position. Empathy alone will not produce equitable care. Compassion, calibrated by reason, is required.

The third contribution is the rational-compassion construct itself. The construct is not just compassion versus empathy. It is compassion informed by reason, by evidence, by calibration. For a project that insists on evidence-based practice and on the alignment between values and structures, rational compassion is the kind of compassion CompassionSolution.Org is recommending.

What the book does not do

The provocative framing draws criticism that pulls some attention away from the actual argument. Some readers, on hearing the title, conclude that Bloom is against caring about other people, which is the opposite of what he is arguing. The translation work to clarify what he is actually saying is sometimes the cost of the title's effectiveness in getting non-readers to read.

Bloom uses empathy in the narrower technical sense (cognitive and affective absorption of another's emotional state). Readers who use the word more broadly, in the colloquial sense that includes what CompassionSolution.Org calls compassion, will find some sentences confusing on first encounter. The translation is the same one The Empathy Effect required from CompassionSolution.Org, in the opposite direction. Bloom narrows; Riess broadens; CompassionSolution.Org distinguishes.

The book is more philosophical than CompassionSolution.Org's primary research-synthesis sources. A reader who wants the empirical apparatus will be better served by Compassionomics, Altruism, or the underlying primary literature. The book is the conceptual companion, not the empirical reference.

Where to put it on the shelf

For any clinician, faculty member, student, or leader who wants the philosophical argument behind the empathy-compassion distinction, Against Empathy is among the more useful single sources available. For anyone arguing the case in contexts where the neuroscience is unfamiliar, the book gives the conceptual version that is often easier to communicate.

The book pairs with the Singer and Klimecki primary literature, with Compassionomics and Wonder Drug (the patient-outcomes case), with Awakening Compassion at Work (the systems-level case), with Altered Traits (the rigorous neuroscience synthesis), and with Altruism (the comprehensive treatment that addresses the same distinctions in different terminology).

Care differently, not less.

References

  1. Bloom, P. (2016). Against empathy: The case for rational compassion. Ecco.
  2. Singer, T., & Klimecki, O. M. (2014). Empathy and compassion. Current Biology, 24(18), R875-R878.
  3. Klimecki, O. M., Leiberg, S., Lamm, C., & Singer, T. (2013). Functional neural plasticity and associated changes in positive affect after compassion training. Cerebral Cortex, 23(7), 1552-1561.
  4. Klimecki, O. M., Leiberg, S., Ricard, M., & Singer, T. (2014). Differential pattern of functional brain plasticity after compassion and empathy training. Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, 9(6), 873-879.
  5. Decety, J., & Cowell, J. M. (2014). The complex relation between morality and empathy. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 18(7), 337-339.
  6. Bloom, P. (2017). Empathy and its discontents. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 21(1), 24-31.